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Summary 
Systemic climate risks, which result from the potential for cascading impacts through inter-related systems, pose 
particular challenges to risk assessment, especially when risks are transmitted across sectors and international 
boundaries. Most impacts of climate variability and change affect regions and jurisdictions in complex ways, and 
techniques for assessing this transmission of risk are still somewhat limited. Here, we begin to define new 
approaches to risk assessment that can account for transboundary and trans-sector risk transmission, by 
presenting: i. a typology of risk transmission that distinguishes clearly the role of climate versus the role of the 
social and economic systems that distribute resources; ii. a review of existing modelling, qualitative and systems-
based methods of assessing risk and risk transmission; and iii. case studies that examine risk transmission in human 
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displacement, food, water and energy security. The case studies show that policies and institutions can attenuate 
risks significantly through co-operation that can be mutually beneficial to all parties. We conclude with some 
suggestions for assessment of complex risk transmission mechanisms: use of expert judgment; interactive scenario 
building; global systems science and big data; innovative use of climate and integrated assessment models; and 
methods to understand societal responses to climate risk. These approaches aim to inform both research and 
national-level risk assessment.  
 
1. Introduction 
Climate change presents significant challenges to decision-making because of its global, multi-decadal and 
potentially catastrophic impacts that challenge standard analyses of trade-offs [1]. Whilst there are opportunities 
associated with climate change [e.g. 2], the biggest challenge to decision-making comes from the risks posed. The 
simplest conceptualisation of climate change risk is to equate it to the likelihood of an event multiplied by its 
consequences. Under this view, discrete events that affect a system, whether the impacts be positive or negative, 
present less risk if they have a small probability of occurring. This view has a number of limitations. First, it tends 
to ignore high-impact low-probability events, since these can be hard to quantify. Second it fails to take account of 
perceptions of risk and probability, which play a central role in determining responses to identified risks. 
Assessments of risk implicitly or explicitly incorporate judgements on tolerance of risk, for example subjective 
judgments on how safe is safe enough [3]. 
 
A third issue with the likelihood and consequences framing of risk is its tendency to downplay risks that are 
relatively far off in time or space. In national assessments of climate risk, the tendency is to examine localised 
consequences and internalisable costs rather than global externalities. For example, decision makers in temperate 
regions may not recognise the importance of risks associated with tropical coral reef degradation. Yet reefs are 
often viewed as global public good with intrinsic importance in terms of the natural world; and they have clear 
indirect linkages to welfare and well-being elsewhere [4], which may affect temperate areas through the flow of 
resources, people and economic dependencies. In effect, decision-makers and risk calculi give lower weight to risks 
that occur in the future and/or are geographically remote with second-order implications. This calculus is 
formalised in discounting practices in cost-benefit analysis, and in national risk assessments where costs outside of 
a country are invisible, or incorporated only if they are known or expected to have secondary knock-on effects [5].  
 
The precautionary principle attempts to account for the limitations of discounting practices in risk assessment by 
providing a moral and legal imperative to act to avoid impacts when there is some threat of harm [6]. The core of 
the principle is that the likelihood or even the consequences of harm need not be known precisely prior to action 
on risk avoidance. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change calls for precautionary action because 
climate change threatens food systems, ecosystems and the prospects for sustainable development. Each of the 
elements of food system and ecosystem integrity as well as sustainable development, are highly contested. Hence, 
as Gardiner [6] points out, the principle is widely discussed but not widely implemented in environmental policy. 
Adopting a precautionary approach involves comparing the cost of inaction (i.e. the estimated cost of future risks) 
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to the cost of action. The latter is often the larger figure; i.e. the costs of action are deemed too high. 
Implementing precaution is also argued to stifle innovation in responses. 
 
The precautionary principle has been useful in emphasising the importance of mitigation. Although risks are hard 
to forecast, especially in a world that is rapidly changing in both physical and human terms, it is nevertheless very 
likely that the greater the warming induced by anthropogenic emissions, the greater the likelihood of the negative 
impacts, from the first-order impacts on local systems, to the transboundary and trans-sector issues identified in 
this paper. It is clear that limiting warming through mitigation will reduce the chance of these risks.  
 
Whilst the precautionary principle has been used to urge action on future risks, it does not obviously deal with the 
neglect of risks that are remote geographically or mediated by second-order impacts. There are so many potential 
pathways for risk transmission that a fully precautionary approach would likely require, by any standards, extreme 
mitigation. Notwithstanding the potential for a more globally just world that mitigation might contain, new 
approaches are therefore needed to assess complex risks that transcend sectors and borders. In this paper, we 
assess how climate risk assessment deals with issues of complexity, focussing on mechanisms of risk transmission 
that significantly alter which (and whose) risks are incorporated.  
 
Techniques for assessing risk transmission in a broad way are still somewhat limited. Our primary aim here is to 
highlight promising methods and begin to define new approaches to risk assessment that can account for 
transboundary climate risk transmission and amplification of risks through competition for resources (section 5). 
These new approaches are underpinned by the development of a new typology of risk transmission mechanisms 
(section 2) and a review of the techniques used for assessing transmitted risks (section 3). They are also informed 
by three risk transmission case studies (section 4) that illustrate the role of policy and markets in amplifying 
transboundary food security risk; climatic- and resource- generated risk transmission in human displacement; and 
cross-sectoral and transboundary risk amplification in water and energy.    
 
2 A typology of risk transmission under changing climates 
The challenges posed by the complexity of multiple causal pathways, and how they operate across space and time, 
present a real challenge for risk assessment. Yet without understanding the interconnected nature of systemic 
risks, there can be no account of their amplification or attenuation through social processes and responses and, 
therefore, no accurate assessment of risk. The cross-border risk transmission mechanisms identified by the UK 
Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017 [7] are shown in Fig. 1. Risks are evident on a range of timescales, from 
current weather-induced risks to longer term changes in climate. Uncertainty in primary impacts and in 
subsequent societal responses means that the ultimate result of climate change risks is not predictable, as shown in 
Fig. 1. For example, there are two possible responses to long term climate-induced global trends: if those trends 
give the UK a comparative advantage qFKDQJHVLQWUDGHrLQWKHILJXUHthen domestic food production could 
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become unsustainable if the response of domestic policy and business is to use unsuitable land for agriculture. 
Equally, if those trends result in decreased productivity then there could be a reliance on imports that exceeds that 
envisaged by current policy. Clearly climate and weather risks do not respect borders. Indeed, as we show later, 
some risks are amplified by international borders. 
  
 
Figure 1. Transboundary risk transmission mechanisms identified in the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 
2017[7]. See also [8]. The left-hand side of the diagram depicts current risks; these are associated with climate 
variability (e.g. floods that disrupt supply chains). Longer term gradual risks are shown on the right-hand side; 
these are the result of changes in both the mean and variability of climate (e.g. changes in crop suitability resulting 
from new climates).  
 
Systemic risks are those that cascade through inter-related systems. Systemic risk in the global financial system is 
perhaps the best known of these risks, particularly in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 [9]. Helbing [10] 
suggests that cascading systemic risks increase in their likelihood in the presence of positive feedbacks and 
threshold or contagion effects, emphasizing the importance of human factors such as negligence, fear, greed and 
revenge. Such social dynamics are most often not incorporated in risk assessment, even though they drive how 
systems actually react: individuals and governments (and even automated financial systems) often act in 
anticipation of perceived risk and react to avoid or deal with that risk in advance of consequences. This 
phenomenon is often conceptualised as the social amplification of risk, where external hazards interact with 
behaviours of individuals and collective responses to further amplify or attenuate the risks [11]. Risks can become 
political crises, according to Homer-Dixon and colleagues [12], if they involve sudden onset, affect a large number 
of people, and have significant short-term impacts.  
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The mechanisms of transmission of risk from one region to another include environmental processes and their 
teleconnections. These include pollution travelling across jurisdictions and boundaries in flows of water and in air, 
and fluctuating shared resources such as fisheries or transboundary water flows. However, climate risks have 
broader multiple direct and indirect pathways that cascade through complex social-ecological systems [13]. Hence 
environmental processes are only a part of the wide array of risk transmission mechanisms, which include flows of 
material, movement of people, and economic and trade linkages [14]. Social responses to risk come about both in 
reaction to exposure to risks and in anticipation of risks. Political systems, market systems, media coverage, 
behavioural responses and the perceptions of physical harm all interact in overall risk amplification [11, 15, 16]. In 
responding to wildfire risks, for example, land use policies determine population densities in at-risk areas, while 
behavioural responses to evacuation guidelines interact in the consequences of such events [17]. 
 
We propose here a typology of risk transmission mechanisms under changing climates WHUPHGVLPSO\oFOLPDWLFULVN 
transmissionpthat clearly distinguishes two possible roles for climate. The first of these is as a trigger for perceived 
risk, a concept that builds upon the basic idea of coincident stresses DVqlong fusesr with single triggering events 
OHDGLQJWRDqELJEDQJr[12]. This we define as climatically-generated transmission, which refers to propagation via 
climate processes and their associated spatio-temporal properties, including across country borders and 
jurisdictions. Examples of this mechanism include spatial teleconnections such as the El NLñR-Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO), which produces events with spatially coherent impacts across the world. As the climate changes, it is 
expected that the variability represented by ENSO will probably change, creating new emerging risks. The 
transmission mechanism here comes through the systematic nature of the climate risk for this type of 
phenomenon, which implies effects beyond the individual local climatic impacts of ENSO. Risk is transmitted 
because of the linked nature of climates across different regions of the world t with trends that may be relatively 
straightforward (e.g. warming) or difficult (e.g. extremes) to predict and detect (see section 3a). Systematic spatial 
patterns include coherent large-scale events such as droughts that lead to multiple impacts in different countries 
and regions). These large-scale events may occur simultaneously (e.g. the linked Russian heat wave and Pakistan 
flooding of 2010; see section 4). For these transmission mechanisms, uncertainty about the scale of impacts can be 
reduced through greater understanding of the biological and physical processes of risk transmission. 
 
Our second class of climatic risk transmission mechanism is associated with real or perceived resource limitations, 
including where climate impacts are anticipated rather than realised. This category, which is a form of social 
amplification of risk, recognises that the response to climate trends and events can often have greater 
consequences than the first-order climate impact itself. These transmission mechanisms typically occur across 
geographical scales and borders and are embedded in competition for resources and economic and political 
institutions. We refer to this as resource-generated transmission (usually amplification), in recognition of the fact 
that it is the scarcity of resource, or at least perception of its scarcity, that is the principal reason for the 
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propagation of risk. This transmission mechanism is therefore characterised by amplification of risks through the 
social systems where those risks are ultimately manifest. Resource-generated amplification may occur because of 
prior systemic risk (e.g. where food systems are failing to deliver food security); or they may be dominated by the 
aggregate response to the climate risk, or even action anticipating real or perceived risk.  
 
It is important to note that the typology is about risk transmission t not risk per se. The domain of our analysis 
pertains entirely to climatic risk transmission and the manner in which it plays out in various ways across the globe.  
In the two classes described above, we distinguish mechanisms where climate is, and is not, the principal 
generation mechanism for climatic risk transmission. For any one impact there will likely be a mixture of 
transmission mechanisms. Fig. 2 summaries the two transmission mechanisms and their linkages. To illustrate with 
an example: food security in a given location is affected by the systematic teleconnections such as ENSO (upper 
left of figure), which disrupt economic activity and affects markets for food and other commodities (upper centre 
of figure). The result is a systematic pattern of impacts on food availability and/or price across multiple regions 
(upper right of figure). This is climatic amplification of food security risk. In contrast, the resource-generated 
amplification of risk is shown along the bottom of the figure. Here, perceived risks play a key role. The various 
linkages between these pathways illustrates the fact that they do not act in isolation.  
 
Figure 2. Pathways of resource- and climatically- generated risk transmission. The former is characterised by 
amplification as a result of systemic risks and/or by perceptions of scarcity and risk (whether or not a real risk 
exists). Climatically-generated risk transmission is characterised by climate-related events or processes that 
become more than the sum of their individual parts because of their systematic nature across time and/or space.  
 
 
A key difference between the two mechanisms is that in resource-generated transmission, climate triggers 
perceived risks that may or may not exist in reality; whereas in climatically-generated risk transmission, climate 
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acts as a real systematic pattern across time and/or space, which may or may not be measured, or even detectable. 
One mechanisms is rooted in perception (social risk) and the other is rooted in the climate system. 
 
One impact of the transmission of climatic risks to food security is food price volatility. Fig. 3 illustrates how a food 
system under gradually increasing pressure from demand and competition for resource is perturbed by a single 
climatic event.  Such shocks interact with the existing market and its rules to drive price signals, which can be 
amplified by a range of endogenous factors. These responses can also create indirect effects reducing overall 
vulnerability of the system in the short-term, for example through bringing more land into agriculture (though this 
may increase long-term climate risk through creating more emissions of greenhouse gases). Thus it is clear that it 
is both the underlying properties of social systems (e.g. functioning of local markets) and the aggregate responses 
of social systems to underlying climate risk (e.g. international financial speculation, or export bans, affecting global 
markets) that can amplify resource-generated risk. In the example presented in Fig. 3, whilst the trigger is climatic, 
only resource-generated transmission mechanisms are in play. To the extent that climate change outpaces natural 
and human adaptation [18], there is however a climatically-generated long term risk transmission mechanism. 
Also, were the climatic trigger to be a systematic pattern such as ENSO then that would constitute a climatically-
generated risk transmission mechanism. The way in which the two types of transmission mechanisms interact to 
play out differently in different cases is explored further in Section 4. 
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Figure 3. Resource-generated risk amplification through price transmission mechanisms in global agricultural 
commodity markets. Adapted from refs [12, 19]. 
 
 
 
3 Current methods and tools for assessing risk transmission  
There are a number of approaches to assessing risk and risk transmission. The brief and non-exhaustive review in 
this section informs the forward-looking content of section 5.  Risk can be quantified either by integration of 
knowledge to produce information on real-world risk, or by focussing on one component of risk (section 3a). In 
the latter category, climate services [20] seek to tailor climate information to the specific needs of users. This is in 
contrast to a knowledge- and data- centric view of climate information, which can often fail to produce actionable 
information [19]. Whilst such stakeholder-led approaches to risk clearly improve the utility of information [21], 
they cannot provide a full mapping of risk transmission. In contrast, quantified and integrated assessments of risk 
(section 3b) provide, in theory at least, a core method for assessing risk transmission. However, in practice, 
assessing impacts and risk inevitably involves qualitative assessment of those components of the system that cannot 
be quantified [22], and so qualitative and systems approaches are required (section 3c). 
 
3a. Modelling sectoral risk using climate models  
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Models have long been used to quantify a diverse range of climate impacts and risks [23-25]. Inherent challenges in 
modelling include the choosing of appropriate prior assumptions and the associated need to explore a large range 
of plausible parameters in order to avoid inaccurate precision [26, 27]. Even for a relatively simple quantity such as 
crop yield, assumptions regarding land use and water availability can systematically affect not only the absolute 
yields, but also the projected percentage changes [28]. Further, methods and experimental design differ across 
modelling studies within any one sector, making direct comparison difficult [27]. Model intercomparison studies 
[29] and meta-analyses [30] can be used to synthesise knowledge and improve models [31, 32], thus meeting t at 
least to some extent t these technical challenges.  
 
Whilst meta-analysis of existing results can be used to summarise knowledge, continued improvement in modelling 
methodologies (both the models themselves and the way in which they are used) is clearly important. Recent 
progress includes techniques to analyse WKHVLJQDORIFOLPDWHFKDQJHUHODWLYHWRWKHoQRLVHpRIXQFHUWDLQW\DQG
variability in order to determine when significant impacts are expected [18, 33-36]. These approaches, which 
identify the time of emergence of key climate signals, have the potential to directly influence policy and practice, 
particularly when combined with stakeholder engagement [21].  
 
3b. Integrated and cross-sector modelling approaches 
Risk transmission pathways very quickly become complex and encompass multiple sectors and spatial domains. 
Interactions across sectors, particularly those involving food and water, are an important determinant of climate 
change impacts [37]. By focussing on a subset of products, supply chain analysis provides one way of bounding the 
transmission system. However, it may ignore important linkages, particularly as world trade is significantly 
interconnected across countries and sectors. Modelling provides a means to capture greater numbers of 
interactions, the relative contribution from different components, and system complexity, within the constraints of 
its underlying assumptions to simplify reality. Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) aim to combine, interpret 
and communicate knowledge across a range of disciplines and have been widely developed and used to identify 
impacts associated with climate change [38]. Understanding the human activities that lead to climate change, as 
well as its effects on natural and human systems, requires insights from many separate disciplines simultaneously 
[39]. The importance of simulating interconnections is increasingly apparent, e.g. in earth system modelling; 
increasing integration of sectors such as water, energy and food (e.g. the water-energy-food nexus); and 
combinations of multiple stressors like malaria, ecosystems, water and food security [40]. 
 
The task of integrating models presents both technical and coordination challenges. Coordinated modelling 
protocols are needed in order to obtain robust results [21]. These protocols can be targeted at specific questions, 
e.g. assessing the impacts of 1.5 degrees of warming [41]. They are usually developed under the umbrella of model 
intercomparison projects, e.g. ISI-MIP [e.g 41] and AgMIP [42]. Through the collaborations they foster, these 
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international projects also help steer the direction of modelling efforts, e.g. through identifying the value of, and 
the challenges in, integration of new sectoral models into existing IAMs [43, 44]. 
 
3c. Qualitative and systems approaches  
Whilst model-based approaches can provide precise projections of the future and its risks, their accuracy, of 
course, depends on the modelling framework and assumptions.  More qualitative approaches, whilst less precise, 
can nonetheless be indicatively useful for risk assessment, and under some circumstances can identify substantially 
different risks than models do, since models may have oEOLQGVSRWVp due to an inability to capture unknown knowns 
(see e.g. Fig 3. of ref. 20). Analogues and scenarios are two qualitative approaches. Identifying analogue conditions 
and interpreting from them provides an observation-based way of assessing risk that can be combined with 
qualitative analysis of risk transmission. Analogues can be spatial [e.g. climate envelopes associated with projected 
climates under different scenarios; see 45], and analogues in time [e.g. 46].  Analyses of the collapse of previous 
civilisations [47] t such as Angkor Wat [48], or the Mayan Civilisation [49] t have been conducted using these 
methods.  Whilst such analogues never match perfectly the focal area or time (history does not repeat itself 
exactly), they can be instructive about the way risks are transmitted through complex socio-environmental systems. 
 
Scenarios can inform thinking about strategic decisions, and are often useful when there are a range of key 
uncertainties which collectively define a set of plausible but different futures [50]. Typically scenarios are co-
designed through the involvement of a range of academic and non-academic stakeholders. They do not attempt to 
forecast the future, but instead describe the parameter space in which the future might plausibly sit, and provide a 
mechanism for thinking through the challenges that might be encountered and the opportunities that might arise.  
Thus, scenarios can also be a tool to examine blind spots and broaden SHUVSHFWLYHVWKH\DUHOHVVDERXWqEHWWLQJRQ
DIXWXUHrDQGPRUHDERXWVWUHVV-testing plans [51, 52] or beliefs to avoid over-confidence, adherence to fixed view 
points, and confirmation biases [53].  As scenarios are based on expert judgement they are typically not 
probabilistic or quantitative, but they can be arbitrarily complex in ways that are difficult to model t e.g. where key 
mechanisms may be uncertain or unknown.  They can, of course, form the basis of selecting variables and 
parameter values that allow modelling of pathways or projections of the future that are mathematically consistent.  
The scenarios used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (SRES and RCPs) are based on 
emissions trajectories and a narrative t the Shared Socio-economic Pathways [54, 55] t that describe and justify 
their patterns. 
 
Strategic games are a particular form of scenarios exercise that can be used for stress-testing and for risk 
identification and management. Here, scenarios unfold dynamically and players respond.  Implicit is a feedback 
between the evolving scenario and the responses.  A recent game [56] was used to examine the stability of global 
food systems under climate change.  Actors represented the public sector in teams across the world, as well as 
international corporations.  Responses to unfolding climate impacts explored how best to minimize risk 
propagation (especially through food price amplification) across the world.   
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Ultimately, country-based risk assessments are based on the range of methods and results currently in the 
literature. The assessments themselves also require a methodology. In UK CCRA 2017, quantitative information 
was supplemented by qualitative analysis. Qualitative studies that focus on interactions between risks often fill key 
knowledge gaps. CCRA risks were subject to an urgency scoring procedure [57], which sequentially assessed the 
magnitude of the risk, the extent to which it is already being managed, and the benefits of action beyond current 
plans within five years. Whilst identification of risk transmission mechanisms does not explicitly form part of the 
methodology, they are central to the assessment of the international and transboundary dimensions of climate 
change within the CCRA [2]. In contrast, the third US National Climate Assessment [58] focussed on climate 
change impacts in the United States, with risk transmission only considered explicitly via water resources shared 
with neighbouring countries. It has been argued that future US assessments need to have a greater focus on risk, 
beginning with analysis of those decisions that are affected by climate and focussing on key risks that are relevant 
to the needs of decision-makers [59]. 
 
4 Illustrative risk transmission case studies  
 
Section 2 presented a typology of risk, characterising climatic- vs resource- generated risk transmission 
mechanisms. There is a vast array of complex mechanisms of both types, each embedded across private actors and 
collective response through markets, institutions and governments. Most risks associated with climate involves 
both climatic and resource mechanisms (c.f. Fig. 2). National risk assessments such as CCRA 2017 are conducted 
by, or at least for, policy makers; and a key component of governance is the extent of regulation of markets. In this 
section we examine a variety of observed risks that are both well-documented and of significant policy concern in 
the light of changing climates. The focus on food security, population displacement risk and transboundary water 
resources illustrates the diverse roles of policy, markets and government responses in transmission of climatic risk. 
Each phenomenon demonstrates that the framing of risk outcomes determines what is measured and also affects 
the policy response: for food security, a focus on domestic food production t rather than food availability and price 
t determines policy responses. Similarly, if policy focuses on whether or not populations cross international 
borders then the risk of weather-induced displacement will focus on border issues rather than social costs of 
displacement.  
 
4a. Climatic and resource-generated transmission of food security risks   
Whilst well-functioning markets allocate resources efficiently, there is an issue when feedbacks between markets 
and policy amplify price signals in non-linear ways.  It is well established that there is a complex causation between 
events and the volatility of global food prices, including energy policy and price, stocks, financial speculation, 
transparency and policy responses [12, 19, 60]. Whilst all of these factors interact and each one can be important 
(Fig. 3), production shortfalls generated by weather extremes are often the initial spark that drives the volatility 
[19]. For example, a shortfall in supply creates a price signal which markets and governments amplify by export 
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bans that prioritise reduction of risks to local food security over global impacts.  In 2010, there was one such spark: 
an exceptional heatwave across much of Europe, Ukraine and Western Russia [61, 62], which was perhaps the 
most extreme heatwave ever recorded [63]. 7KHKHDWZDYHZDVH[WUHPHERWKLQLWVPDJQLWXGHRYHU&DQGLWV
duration, from July to mid-August.  At the same time, and causally related [64], the Indus Valley in Pakistan 
received unprecedented rainfall creating flooding that disrupted the lives of 20 million people [65].  Analysis of 
hemispheric climate processes suggests that the co-occurrence of these events was related to Arctic warming and 
its impacts on atmospheric Rossby waves [66]. Thus there is a climatically-generated component (systematic spatial 
pattern) to the transmission of risk operating alongside the resource-generated component (responses to perceived 
risk amplify risk).  
 
The shortfall in grain harvest in Russia resulting from the heatwave amounted to about a third [67].  As it became 
clear that the volume of Russian grain was significantly less than expected, Russia instituted an export ban on 
grain, against the worry of its own internal food security.  This stayed in place from August 2010-July 2011.  This 
shortfall in global grain production, coupled with the export ban, fuelled price rises on the global commodity 
markets [68] t wKLFKURVHSDUWO\WKURXJKqSDQLFEX\LQJrDQGSDUWO\WKURXJKspeculation [69].  As a result, the FAO 
cereal price index rose rapidly from a value of around 150 in Summer 2010 to around 250 in Spring 2011.  As with 
2007-8, other countries responded in a largely uncoordinated way, each driven by internal political dynamics and 
national self-interests [70].  Market and policy responses can create spill over between crops that are affected 
by the original weather event (wheat) and those unaffected (e.g. rice) t as was very prevalent in the 2007-8 
food price spike [71]. 
 
Analysis of responses to food prices rises in 2010-11 in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, and Zambia, showed that 
populations who are food insecure due to low income (a) worked harder, (b) ate less, (c) lived more austerely, (d) 
drew on savings and household assets, (e) responded politically through criticism of their governments.  Those 
affected peceived their problems as having a political cause, often associated with collusion between powerful 
incumbent interests (of politicians and big business) and disregard for the poor [72].  This politicised response 
contributed to food-related civil unrest in a number of countries in 2010/11 [73].  In Pakistan, where there were 
food-related riots in 2010 [73], food price rises were exacerbated by the floods, which directly affected cotton, rice, 
wheat and sugar, and resulted in damage and losses of US$ 5 billion and zero growth in the sector [74]. 
 
In the UK, the upturn in commodity markets influenced food inflation, with approximately a 5-fold increase in 
food inflation in the latter half of 2010 [75].  Analysis of purchases in the 5 years from 2007 to 2011 [76] in the UK 
indicated that people bought 4.2% less food, but paid 12% more for it.  The poorest 10% spent 17% more in 2011 
than in 2007.  There is evidence that poor populations for whom food represents a high proportion of household 
expenditure also traded down to save money by buying cheaper alternatives.  However, in extremis, people simply 
could not afford food.  Use of emergency foodbanks increased nearly 50 percent in 2010 [77]. The fact that global 
markets determine local prices highlights the importance of managing the balance of risks between local people 
and people far away.  A key cause of food price spikes comes from governments reducing local risks (by instituting 
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export bans to hedge against supply shortfalls), at the expense of accelerating the global perceptions of likely 
shortfall, and global impacts. 
 
Clearly the issue of food security and response to climate affects all countries and parts of the global food system, 
while the risks are manifest in different ways in food exporting countries, countries with large poor populations, 
and countries that are concerned with food in terms of price and affordability. Assessment of international 
dimensions of climate risk for the UK, for example, highlights (in addition to opportunities, which are out of scope 
here) risks from extreme weather abroad impacting supply chains and prices. However, risks arise not just from 
extremes, but also from trends (see Fig. 1). Risks generated by climatic trends can be subtle and hence difficult to 
identify. For example, time of emergence techniques (section 3a) have been used to identify a climatically-
generated risk transmission pathway: the mechanisms for delivering new seed (development, breeding, 
dissemination, adoption) fail to keep up with rates of warming, simply because the variety is bred in a cooler 
environment to that in which it is eventually used [18]. In both of these cases t risks to food prices and the risk of 
mis-matched crops t coordination of policies for risk management is a huge task involving many government 
departments and likely also the private sector; as well as requiring significant international coordination [2, 18]. 
 
4b. Climat  and resource-generated amplification in risks of population displacement 
As discussed in 4a, climate risks are manifest directly or indirectly through interactions with resources, and these 
risks can be amplified or attenuated through the complex interactions of markets, land use and ecological 
processes. The confluence of factors and the weakest link in systems can be a critical determinant of outcomes. 
Thus the ability to specify the contribution of climatic risk (real or perceived) can be more important in assessing 
likely future risks (as climate continue to change) than it is in responding to current risks.  
 
Population displacement is defined as the involuntary and unplanned movement of people from their place of 
residence due to weather-related impacts on property and infrastructure [78]. Such movement is most often 
temporary and short-lived. But it is often highly disruptive and traumatic to those involved: Munro et al. [79], for 
example, show that displacement from flooding events in England decreased mental health and increased 
depression and anxiety a year after populations were evacuated from their homes. Displacement from floods, 
droughts and wildfire is common in every region of the world. Estimates of the number of people affected, 
including those directly displaced from their residences by weather-related extremes is over 26 million per year 
[80].  
 
While most people directly displaced by weather-related extreme events return to their original place of residence, 
such events also trigger longer-term permanent migration. The overall population of New Orleans city, for 
example, declined sharply after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, from 480,000 in 2000 to 344,000 in 2010, with many 
displaced residents not returning in a process termed staged migration [81]. The major floods in Pakistan in 2010 
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led to an estimated 1.6 million damaged or destroyed homes, and responses included both quick return and more 
permanent relocation within Pakistan [82]. 
 
The risks associated with displacement are principally to those directly affected, through economic shocks, and the 
impact on public and health service provision. There is some evidence that natural disasters undermine 
government legitimacy directly, and/or indirectly through economic shocks, and hence increase risks of insecurity 
and even conflict [83, 84].  But the risks to political systems are malleable and determined by how they respond. In 
the case of the Pakistan floods, for example, Fair et al. [85] showed how positive government responses and self-
help collective action during the floods was perceived as positive and led to flooded populations increasing their 
civic and political engagement in the recovery period.  
 
Both the Pakistan floods and the displacement in Louisiana and New Orleans associated with Hurricane Katrina 
demonstrate how climatic risks can be amplified through individual and collective responses. The amplification of 
risks occurs both through prior decisions concerning land use and uneven distribution of resources and 
vulnerability among populations. Reponses to perceived risks can also amplify risks, even where direct impacts are, 
as in the Pakistan and US cases, largely contained within the borders of one country. Thus, in the language of our 
typology, risk of displacement and migration can clearly be the result of either climatically-generated transmission: 
large-scale droughts, floods or hurricanes can trigger displacement across borders (the weather abroad affects 
domestic risk directly). There is likely also be a resource-generated transmission mechanism: people are displaced 
because they lack water, food, shelter.  
 
Some mass displacement events are more ambiguous in terms of climatic and resource mechanisms. Displacement 
from drought in Syria in the late 2000s, for example, is instructive of how the question of attribution of 
displacement to climatic- or resource- generated transmission mechanisms is less relevant than the interaction of 
multiple elements of risk. In Syria in that period, there is uncertainty about the scale of drought-induced 
displacement of populations from rural areas into cities in northern regions of the country. But the civil conflict 
starting in 2011 led to mass displacement of close to five million people from Syria into neighbouring countries and 
across the world (with ten percent of the refugees moving to Europe). The first of these displacements has been 
claimed to be climatically-triggered, while the second has been claimed to be a link between climate change and 
conflict [86]. 
 
Several studies have claimed a link between observed climatic changes in the northern Mediterranean region and 
the drought experienced by Syria and neighbouring countries from 2006-9 [87, 88]. The evidence falls short of risk 
assessment, however, since that would require identification of mechanisms and evidence of how displacement or 
conflict risks were amplified or attenuated following the drought. Many commentators  [86] have taken the 
presence of the drought and the role of climatic changes in that drought as evidence of climate change playing a 
contributory factor in both the Syrian civil conflict and even in the European refugee crisis that resulted directly 
from the conflict. However, the transmission mechanisms between the weather-related risk, the resource base and 
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the subsequent risks are, in the Syrian case, largely absent. Selby et al. [86] examine, for the first time in detail, 
whether or not the drought caused mass displacement from rural northern Syria (estimates range from 30,000 up 
to 1.5 million), and whether the presence of such populations in cities was involved in conflict as participants or 
victims. They find a lack of evidence for either of the mechanisms. Despite this, there are significant reasons for 
concern that climatic changes do indeed increase conflict risk by affecting the underlying risk factors such as 
poverty and insecurity and the ability of states to meet expectations of their social contract to their citizens [89, 90].  
 
There are multiple examples and multiple lines of evidence that displacement of populations represents a 
significant risk from climate change impacts. The triggers for such unplanned displacement include [91, 92] 
flooding, drought, and long term changes as areas become less habitable as a result of such risks and due to sea 
level rise [93]. Neumann et al [91] for example, show how projected population growth in urban settlements in 
Africa in particular, significantly increases populations exposed to flood risk. The potential for resource-generated 
amplification is significant for these types of risks. Hence risk assessment, in explaining the mechanisms of 
amplification, has the potential to foster policy responses that attenuate rather than amplify existing risks.  
 
4c. Cross-sectoral and transboundary risk amplification in water and energy 
Linkages between sectors can be a critical part of risk transmission (c.f. upper middle box in Fig. 2). Similarly, the 
existence of shared resources across national boundaries can transmit climatic risk. Once again, both climatic- and 
resource- generated transmission mechanisms are important, as we illustrate here for the water and energy sectors.  
 
Freshwater use has strong spatial dimensions that act as a resource amplification of climate risks associated with 
trends and variability in quantity and quality. Climate processes such as the ENSO act across multiple spatial 
scales and many river basins and groundwater aquifers lie across national and administrative jurisdictions. The 
third national US climate impacts assessment [94] identifies cross-boundary coordination at multiple levels as a 
requisite for ensuring that the US Great Lakes, the Columbia River, and the Colorado River can deal with 
drought. Conversely, lack of cooperation over international waters may contribute to conflict, making the goal of 
cooperation important in securing regional peace [95].  In addition, there are significant amounts of water 
embedded in traded products, particularly food, that generate further linkages and pathways for risk transmission 
[96]. Globally 11% of groundwater use for irrigation comes from non-renewable resources, with depletion being 
greatest in those countries providing the largest source of staple crops; this water is therefore embedded in food 
trade [97]. 
 
Local patterns of water misuse or scarcity have the potential to spill over into larger domains should 
transboundary governance mechanisms fail. In spite of these large-scale linkages, governance of water resources is 
predominantly focused on water quality and quantity within watersheds and within jurisdictions. Where there is a 
focus on the large-scale it is often on transboundary surface waters (not groundwater) and gives limited attention 
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to temporal variability and pollution [98]. Clearly, managing the hydrological cycle is a key component of 
transboundary governance. Increasing water scarcity and resulting competition for water driven by growth in 
population and consumption, particularly for irrigation, have been key in generating concern about global water 
security through resource-generated transmission of risk. Pathways of transition in societal water use include 
moving from exploitation to greater focus on supply augmentation and conservation [99]. In some countries with 
limited per capita water resources, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, growing demand for food has 
been met through imports (with  associated embedded water) [100], leading to exposure to price volatility and 
concern about national sufficiency. 
 
Transboundary issues do not solely arise from degrading groundwater resources.  Evaporation from land and 
water surfaces generates atmospheric water vapour and recent advances in hydrometeorology have revealed 
atmospheric rivers or precipitation sheds, thus allowing tentative quantification of sources and sinks of 
precipitation [101]. Modifications to land-use may alter evaporation differentially across locations, countries and 
even continents. Improved understanding of these spatial linkages is generating interest in the design of legal and 
institutional processes for the governance of moisture recycling [101]. 
 
Southern Africa exemplifies strong regional-scale connections between climate, water and energy [102]. Periodic 
(O1LñRHYHQWVWHQGWREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKEHORZQRUPDOUDLQIDOOLQH[WHQVLYHDUHDVRIWKHUHJLRQ[103, 104]. The 
PDMRU(O1LñRHYHQWLQ-16 brought enhanced rainfall variability globally [105] - but well below normal rainfall 
in much of southern Africa [106]. Impact transmission pathways are enhanced by the 15 shared river basins that 
dominate the hydrology of the region, including the Zambezi basin, shared by eight countries. The surface basins 
are underlain by an estimated 16 transboundary aquifers [107]. Large-scale dams and inter-basin, often 
transboundary, water transfers reinforce transmission pathways. Regional governance mechanisms further 
strengthen the physical linkages between countries, particularly through the Southern Africa Development 
Community, which has established protocols on shared water, energy and food security and initiatives on trade.  
 
Energy security also has an important transboundary dimension through the Southern African Power Pool 
(SAPP), which is a regional mechanism of energy trading and infrastructure interconnections between many of the 
UHJLRQpVFRXQWULHV Hydropower comprises a major component of regional energy production accounting for over 
90% of electricity generation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia 
[108]. 5HOLDEOHHOHFWULFLW\SURGXFWLRQLVWKHUHIRUHDWULVNGXULQJGURXJKWV5HFHQWFRQGLWLRQVGXULQJWKH(O1LñRRI
2015-16 highlight the scale of hydropower disruption associated with drought. Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe all experienced electricity outages (load shedding) partly due to the effects of low rainfall on reservoir 
levels and electricity generating capacity [109]. Load shedding brings significant economic disruption, for example, 
LQ0D\=DPELDpVQDWLRQDOSRZHUXWLOLW\ZDUQHGWKDWLWmay cut power supplies by one-third and the Finance 
Minister reduced the forecast for national GDP growth by over 1%, partly in response to this warning [110]. The 
SAPP serves in part to manage energy deficits and fluctuations through trade in electricity and may become an 
important dimension of risk mitigation of climatically-induced supply disruption. However, intra-regional trade in 
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energy is very low at present, and the system faces considerable political and infrastructural challenges. The 
systematic impact of climate on the energy sector constitutes a climatically-generated risk transmission mechanism. 
Short term responses in Tanzania have included use of expensive privately-owned gas generators. Longer-term 
goals to diversify energy mix, in some cases increasing reliance on fossil fuels and exposure to price volatility, are 
associated with resource-generated amplification of risk (e.g. in Malawi and Tanzania). 
 
5 Assessing systemic  across borders and sectors: towards new methods 
The challenges of incorporating climatic and resource-generated amplification as well as transboundary and trans-
sector risk transmission mechanisms into national climate assessments are significant. As illustrated in Section 4, 
mechanisms range from individual climatic events to more subtle climate trends, which can interact with each 
other and have complex cascading ramifications on socially complex resource interactions. Climate risk 
assessments that are restricted to a single region or jurisdiction will find it very difficult to capture this range of 
mechanisms. The tools and case studies analysed above point towards a number of overlapping and 
complementary approaches to meeting this challenge.  
 
5a. Plurality of approaches supported by expert judgment and interactive scenario-building  
Assessment of systemic risk is likely to be very different in character from single-sector risk assessments. In 
particular, high-impact, low-probability events have insufficient precedents to fully understand risk transmission. 
The lack of sufficient precedents poses a real problem for probabilistic forecasting, where there is a direct 
relationship between the value of a forecast and perception of the benefits of acting on such predictions [111]. 
Furthermore, lack of data means that causal pathways cannot be well described, at least not without considerable 
uncertainty, in a model-based framework.  And those pathways that are known, and well-characterised, may have 
their impacts amplified or mitigated by less-known pathways that are not modelled.  Thus whilst high-impact low-
probability events occur within single sectors, they directly affect systemic risk; and their very nature presents 
problems for assessing risk transmission. 
 
Given that no single risk assessment method can be comprehensive, our recommendation is that multiple 
approaches are needed: quantitative, qualitative, and hypothetical. The particular combination depends upon the 
specific domain of the system under consideration t i.e. the system boundary [21]. Examining local risks will likely 
require a different framework to a study of cascading global risks with indirect impact. Once the domain of a study 
is clear, targeted mixed-method approaches to risk assessment can be developed. These are likely to need a 
number of characteristics. First, the combination of methods needs to be able to incorporate plausible, but often 
unknown, risks and transmission mechanisms alongside better characterised ones. This is important because 
indirect pathways can very often exert a much larger influence than direct pathways in complex systems, which can 
be highly non-linear in nature [112, 113]. The importance of understanding complex topologies for assessing 
systemic risks is increasingly recognised in human systems [12, 114].  
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A second characteristic of systemic risk assessments is the ability to successfully synthesise the range of expert 
judgements. Lessons learnt from IPCC AR5 on this subject include the need for a simple and rigorous framework 
with practices that minimise biases in expert judgement whilst integrating subjective expert views with quantitative 
evidence [115]. One area where such integration is very important is that of low-probability high-impact events 
such as flooding, where the limitations of modelling imply a need for new methods that use models in targeted 
ways alongside expert judgment.  
 
Scenario-based approaches (section 3c) may prove effective in integrating the views of a range of stakeholders with 
the methods and results from theoretical approaches to risk assessment. They can be used to examine the 
consequences of plausible futures, and test whether the current state of the system would be able to cope with 
them, or how shocks may play out within them.  They can also be useful to design policy (public or private) that 
may work to minimise risks or costs and maximise benefits.  For example, in a future where the world is more 
regionalised and less globalised [55, 116], it might be expected that a focal country would be less exposed to 
climate shocks elsewhere in the world, but more exposed to local effects.  In such cases, what policy (such as local 
stocks of food) could buffer against shortfalls?  Similarly, different plausible scenarios may differentially represent 
costs and benefits, and backcasting from the more desired futures [117] can create pathways, or timelines, that 
represent decision points, opportunities and threats.  Participatory scenarios and backcasting also act to create 
common understanding and ownership of risks and opportunities.   
 
While scenarios are typically qualitative pathways having a narrative nature, more sophisticated analyses can be 
conducted that involve quantitative analysis.  For example, the IPCC scenarios involve both a narrative strand and 
model-based analysis of pathways.  Furthermore, expert, qualitative, analysis of scenarios or sensitivity analyses of 
models can indicate where there may be particularly strong leverage points t where small changes may exert large 
influences t and therefore be the focus of policy development.  
 
The processes through which decisions are made in conditions of uncertainty is highly relevant to risk 
transmission, both because the transmission mechanisms themselves involve decisions (see section 4) and because 
existing methods for planning under deep uncertainty, e.g. dynamic adaptive policy pathways [118], might be 
tailored to deal with transboundary systemic risk (see section 4c). Existing approaches that allow for the diverse 
views of stakeholders in generating robust plans [119] could prove useful, given that perceptions of risk differ, and 
precision in quantifying transboundary risks is often not possible. Pathways and backcasting approaches will no 
doubt prove useful in assessing system risk across borders and sectors. Promising areas include mapping out path 
dependencies and foster adaptive policymaking [118]; and assessment of the implications of path dependency, 
interactions between adaptation plans, vested interests and global change [120]. 
 
 
5b Global systems science and big data 
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One clear message from the research reviewed in this paper is the criticality of understanding systemic risk; it is 
the landscape in which risk transmission occurs and goes well beyond the kind of risks usually associated with 
climate change. There is widespread recognition of the potential for cascading failures in trade, financial, 
infrastructure, health and environmental systems, and the role of climate change in initiating cascades. Separate 
disciplines are promoting their insights to the study and management of these challenges whilst recognising the 
need for new multi- and inter-disciplinary approaches. These new complex interconnected systems are 
fundamentally different and at present our understanding is limited to individual, sparse or static networks [10]. 
Walker et al. [121] see gaps in the functions that existing transnational institutions provide to address global-scale 
failures and argue for improved design of institutions with stronger focus on cooperation, willingness to implement 
agreements and the need for legitimacy. Helbing [10] SURSRVHVDo*OREDO6\VWHPV6FLHQFHpWRPHHWWKHUHTXLUHG
knowledge demands. Design and operation principles in the application of this science include: the use of self-
organising systems with the aim of achieving resilient system design and management; the need for back-up 
systems running in parallel to any primary system; that diversity can promote systemic resilience, adaptability and 
innovation; that system size should be limited; and that reducing connectivity to reduce the strength of 
interlinkages should be considered. In particular, new combinations of risk can be assessed using network analysis, 
the use and collection of big data, and innovative machine learning techniques to analyse and make use of new 
insights into emergent patterns of behaviour [10]. 
  
The internet and social media now provide vast scope for data and news (and, unfortunately, misinformation) 
about disease outbreaks, economic indicators and other events through press reports, blogs, chat rooms web search 
analytics, Google Trends and tweets [122, 123]. Citizen science has an important role to play in this emergent 
arena, with its potential to act as a powerful self-organising force. Areas for further research and development 
include understanding of the quantity and quality of information, methods for guaranteeing the trustworthiness 
and security of information, ways to integrate formal and informal sources of information and new ways for 
extracting information [124]. 
 
&RPSOH[V\VWHPVDQGoELJGDWDpDSSURDFKHVDUHQRWDSDQDFHDt social science highlights the importance of the 
societal dimensions that include, among other things, reputation, trust, social norms, culture and behaviour [10, 
125]. Indeed Galaz et al. [125] argue there is often failure to integrate insights from the wider social sciences in 
relation to globally networked or systemic risks leading to naƃve assumptions about the behaviour of government 
and non-governmental actors in the real-world. They identify five key conditional insights from diverse literatures 
as follows: whilst international institutions are important, they are challenged by globally networked risks; whilst 
the international norms evolve slowly, they can in some instances respond rapidly; whilst institutions for 
international crisis management are critical, they are difficult to reform (even after crisis); whilst stimulating new 
capacities is important, successful policy initiatives are often difficult to up-scale; and whilst there is a strong 
relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness, it is often unclear what the best reform options are [125]. In this 
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vein, Centeno et al. [126] highlight how social problems are constructed and how responses reflect social 
hierarchies. They stress there is endogeneity of risk within global systems; that the actual structure and processes 
followed by organisations to manage local risks may ultimately produce larger systemic risks [126]. They find value 
from the deep insights, arising from fine-grained analyses of qualitative research on specific contexts, about 
elements of complexity, how they arise and how they interact. 
 
. Innovative use of climate and integrated assessment models 
Climate models can be more than sources of input data for impacts and assessment models. The re-framing of 
uncertainty into the time dimension t i.e. the ability to ask when climate signals are likely to emerge from the 
background noise of climate variability [35, 36], i.eWKHoWLPHRIHPHUJHQFHp7R( t has the potential to make a 
significant impact on methods for assessment of systemic risk, including transboundary issues outlined in section 
4c.  ToE can be calculated for first-order variables that are fundamentally important to cross-border risk 
transmission t as in the case of crop breeding reviewed briefly in section 4a. Systematic trends in extreme events 
are more difficult to detect [33] and may require long climate model simulations with constant forcing, and analysis 
of long-term observations, in order to properly estimate probabilities. 
 
The spread in responses of physical models to climate change makes quantification of ToE for some variables such 
as precipitation difficult. However, some of the variables identified above as being important for cross-border risk 
transmission, such as aridity and basin-scale river flow, are driven by both changes in temperature and 
precipitation, making estimates of ToE more tractable [127]. Furthermore, impacts such as sea level rise and 
cryospheric changes are functions of time-integrated radiative forcing or integrated temperature responses, which 
also implies tractability. Others, such as ecosystem changes that depend on the "velocity of climate change" [128] 
may be represented by rates of change of the atmospheric circulation.  
 
There are several ways in which models in the natural and social sciences can be used to estimate systemic risks in 
the sort of multivariate, transboundary cases considered in this paper. Here we briefly consider two. The first is 
tractable, practical and quantifiable: use models of the climate system and single-sector impact models (see section 
3a). Whilst cross-sectoral interactions or complex value chains will not be captured, this approach could identify 
the primary sites from which significant, early transboundary risks might emerge, with such groups of countries 
EHLQJLGHQWLILHGDVqHDUOLHVWFRPPRQGHQRPLQDWRUVr [35] - those most likely to emerge as the earliest candidates 
for specific vulnerabilities. 
 
In contrast to the model-centric scanning of the globe implied by the earliest common denominators approach, a 
second, more qualitative, approach focusses on potentially cascading impacts - an important property where 
resilience is determined by the chance of surprises. Many transboundary risks are shaped by multi-sectoral factors, 
and the role of IAMs in resolving these has been detailed in section 3b. A key challenge here is to focus on how 
complete multi-sectoral analyses are, given uncertainties in the baseline case: cross-sectoral sensitivities might 
significantly change as the world warms and circulation, precipitation and aridity patterns are altered. Similarly, 
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the physical teleconnections that are now known from climatology might themselves change, implying very 
different cross-sectoral and geographical sensitivities. IAM-based approaches must therefore undertake the 
difficult task of attempting to understand, quantitatively or qualitatively, the possibility of dramatic or even radical 
changes to patterns of production, trade, and cross-sector dependencies. Here the idea RIoHDUOLHVWSRWHQWLDOSLQFK
SRLQWVp - those pathways most likely to emerge as earliest candidates for disruption - may prove useful for thinking 
about how such complex system-wide multi-sectoral pathways might be represented, and also for how IAMs might 
be evaluated. 
 
5d. New approaches to understanding and supporting societal responses to climatic risk 
Climate risk assessment usually focuses on direct mechanisms of transmitting risk and the societal response is 
often either omitted completely or limited to the role of markets. New approaches are needed to understand 
societal roles, both within and well beyond markets. Well-functioning markets can allocate resources in response 
to climatic risk: if there is a shortfall in supply, price signals increase supply.  However, there is an issue is when 
markets and policy amplify the price signal in a highly non-linear way (see section 4a).  Markets work within the 
framework of national and international policy, both of which have typically had their focus on economic growth 
and the global public good that comes from lowering prices.  We suggest that a greater understanding of risk 
management and amplification will enable new thinking on how markets can best serve society. How can markets 
function to deliver public goods (low prices and economic growth) on average, as well as in a way that is robust to 
the complex risks arising from climate change?  What are the properties of a market that attenuates rather than 
amplifies risk? 
 
A second area where improved understanding of societal roles would support risk attenuation is that of decision-
making. Section 5a emphasises the role of plurality in improving understanding of risk transmission and building 
scenarios. Whilst this includes societal roles, the gap in understanding is sufficiently wide that a specific focus on 
these roles is well justified. There is a literature on decision-making under uncertainty that, whilst not yet dealing 
explicitly with transmission of climatic risk across sectors and borders, is likely to be highly relevant to new 
methods of assessing systemic risk in those settings. For example, structured yet flexible approaches for assessing 
causal risks within and across food, energy, environment and water systems already exist [129].  
 
A focus on decision-making within the risk transmission typology presented here may come to yield direct benefits 
to risk assessments. The centrality of perceptions of risk in the resource-generated mechanism suggests a key role 
for climate information in aligning perceptions with reality. Analysis of climate and other data (sections 5a-5c) may 
yield additional benefits by identifying unforeseen risks (as in the crop breeding case in section 4a). Equally, the 
systemic nature of climate suggests the potential for coordinated, or at least synergistic, decision-making t as 
outlined in our discussion of markets and policy.  
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6 Conclusions 
In this study we have examined the challenge for risk assessment posed by climatic risk transmission cascades over 
space and time. Food security, population displacement and the management of transboundary water resources 
are key risks with important trans-boundary and trans-sector dimension. Their dynamics differ, and they also 
interact. Our analysis shows that policies and institutions can attenuate risks significantly through co-operation 
that can be mutually beneficial to all parties. Assessing risk transmission mechanisms across sectors and 
international boundaries, and coordinating policies across government departments and across local and national 
governments, are therefore necessary steps in prioritising adaptations to changing climates [8]. Assessments and 
policy approaches of this kind can only be achieved through broad framings of risk. One such framing, used 
throughout this study, focusses on the role of climate versus that of societal responses and perceptions; i.e. 
climatic- and resource-generated amplification mechanisms. Other framings, developed in section 5, focus more 
on the development of new methods for this complex challenge. We hope that these framings can support future 
national-level risk assessments, ensuring that they take adequate account of climatic risk transmission mechanisms.  
 
 
Additional Information 
 
Information on the following should be included wherever relevant.  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Transboundary risk transmission mechanisms identified in the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 
2017[7]. See also [8]. The left-hand side of the diagram depicts current risks; these are associated with climate 
variability (e.g. floods that disrupt supply chains). Longer term gradual risks are shown on the right-hand side; 
these are the result of changes in both the mean and variability of climate (e.g. changes in crop suitability resulting 
from new climates). 
 
 
Figure 2. Pathways of resource- and climatically- generated risk transmission. The former is characterised by 
amplification as a result of systemic risks and/or by perceptions of scarcity and risk (whether or not a real risk 
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exists). Climatically-generated risk transmission is characterised by climate-related events or processes that 
become more than the sum of their individual parts because of their systematic nature across time and/or space. 
 
Figure 3. Resource-generated risk amplification through price transmission mechanisms in global agricultural 
commodity markets. Adapted from refs [12, 19]. 
 
